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ThEGAINS AND IDSSES FROM INWSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
Sam Peltzma.n
Nofield in the industrial organization literature has been aswell
plowed as the relationship between concentrationand profitability. Weiss
(19711),inhis latest review of this literature, d.iscusses over4O such
studies since 1951, andthisis not a complete census. The reader has by
this late date earned the right to demand strong justificationfor a new
entrant. Mine is simply that,despite its bulk, theliteraturefails to inform
ushow to interpret its mainfindings.
Those findings are well known: with few exceptions, market concen-
tration and industry profitability arepositivelycorrelated. since the
correlationis usually weak,the literature has tended to become a search
formorecomplex and/or accurately specified relationships. I eschewthat
approach to focus on a more basic question: if concentrationand profitability
are indeed related, what market process produces the relationship?The
traditional answer has been that high concentration facilitates collusion and
hence super marginal-cost pricing, for which some profitability measureis a
proxy. Unfortunately, this answer does not logicallyfollow from the usual
evidence, so its acceptance by economists and practitioners of antitrust policy
is little more than an act of faith.
Any profitability measure implies a corresponding difference between
prlee and average cost. As a matter of simple arithmetic a causal relationship
running from concentration to profitability can operate either through an
effect on price (the usual interpretation) or on average cost, or, of course,2
both. Acceptance of the pure collusion interpretation of the evidence has
so far hinged on the largely untested assumption that concentration has
little or no connection with the implied average cost measure. However,
indirect tests of the assumption, most notably by Dernsetz (1973), imply
that it may not be useful, and his finding is one motive to the present
work.
In essence, this paper will try to decompose the concentration-profits
relationship into separate concentration-price arid concentration-cost
relationships. By doing this, I hope to shed light on some of the allocative
and distributive issues that, I suspect, give the subject its intrinsic
interest, but which have not so far been confronted empirically: les high
concentration save or waste resources? 1es it lead to higher prices? Who
gains and loses from a social policy hostile to high concentration? Since the
unique aspect of the paper is its focus on a concentration-cost relationship,
most of the analytical effort is spent here. I review the theory underlying
such a relationship, and develop and implement a model designed to estimate
its importance. Subsequently, I try to estimate how much of the usual profit-
concentration relationship is due to cost effects and how much to price effects.
The main conclusion is that, while price effects are not absent, the cost
effects so dominate them as to cast doubt on the efficacy of any general legal
rule hostile to industrial concentration.3
p.
I.Market Structure, Costsand Prices
The possibility that nrket structure and costs are related has of
course long been recognized. An unconcentrated industry in which a
technologicaladvance produces "natural monopoly" or oligopoly cost
conditionswill become both more concentratedandmoreefficient over time.
Theprocess by which the old technolo is rendered economically obsoletewill
alsoentail a fall (or at least no increase) in price. The price decline need
notbegreat enough to eliminate producer rents, either because the associated
increasein concentration permits collusion or because the new technology
diffusesslowly enoughtoleave room in the market for a fringeof' old-
technology firms. Whichever force operates, there is a clear dilemma for
antitrustpolicy: attempts to thwart increasedconcentration will merely
wasteresources without benefiting consumers.1
The concentration-profitability literature has so far given little
weight to "natural oligopoly" interpretations of the data. Two reasons for
this neglect are important enough to affect the structure of this study:
1. A "natural oligopoly" interpretation is asymmetric. Some techno-
logical progress can be scale-reducing. If this sort of' change diffuses
slowly enough, or cannot be implemented as efficiently by all firms,the
large firms will be the marginal firms and smafl firms will earnrents. Thus
weshould observe unusually low(or declining) as well as high concentration
associatedwith unusually high rates of return. By andlarge, such a U-shaped
concentration-profits relationship has not been found. One inference could
bc that rents to size-specific technical change are unimportant empirically.
However,itwould be just as easy to conclude that large size-related
economiesare simply more prevalent. Or, to the extent t.hut such economies
arespecific toa few oranizaUons, thelargc'-size-relat.eI et'onomie; wMI14
dominatein the usual data: Three clever firms producing 1,000 cars per week
at half of General Motors' unit cost will have trivial impact on automobile
prices or the measured efficiency of the automobile industry. I shall attempt
to disentangle the possibilities empirically rather than intuitively. The
model I develop permits any kind of change in market structure to reflect
size-relatedtechnological change, andleavesthe importance of the relation-
ship to be determined empirically.
2. The empirical literature on economies of scale seems to conflict
with a "natural oligopoly" interpretation.A common finding of this literature
isthat of long-run constant costs at the firm level over a wide rangeof
output, wide enough to encompass manyexisting-firmsizes and a large fraction
of industry output. To Illustrate, Bain (19514) andStigler(1958) both find
that the nUnimurn-efficient-size steel firmproduces something like 2 percent
ofnational output. Smaller firms had less than 20 percent of national
capacity in 1951 (Stigler, 1958). While some efficiency might be gained by a
decline of this inefficient fringe, any substantial change in market structure
would. likely involve a reallocation of output among efficient-sized firms.
However,that sort of inference mightonly mean thatthe economies-of-
scale paradigm is notveryuseful, ratherthan that marketstructure and
efficiency are unrelated. Indeed, the imprecision of scale-economy
rationalizations of market structure can itself be of help in formulating
such a relationship. If there is nounique efficient firmsize, but only
a wide band encompassing many existing firms, then anyof these firmscan
growto the upper end of the band before it incurs size diseconomies. This
kind of expansion by a firm becomes likely, instead of merely possible, if
the firm discovers a lower cost 1cchno1or which is not invnediatc],y
availableto others. The potential profits from the cost advantage will then5
attractcapital andpermitthe firm to growatleast to the upper end of the
band, though,toget there, the firmmay also haveto reduce prices. Thus,
thefo.rturiate firm, or firms, become big instead of merely "average" (concen-
tration increases), and resource costs and prices are lowered by this
unusual growth.
This argument, which can be found in Demsetz (1973) and McGee (1971),
issketched inFigure 1.
Let P1Lbe the long-runsupplycurve of a competitive industry with
demand, D. LetP1RM bethe long-run firm supply curve, so, following the
scale-economies literature, firm size is indeterminate in the range OB. We
observe an actual (or average) firm output of OA. The industry is in
equilibrium with a price of 0P1, zero rents anda four-firm concentration
ratioof, say, 14.(OA/OC). Now, onerepresentative firmdiscovers a way to
lower marginal costs to QNBM. In this perfectly-competitive-industry
example, it cutsprice trivially, andexpandsfrom OA to OB. There are
now positive rentsfor this firm(and for the industry aggregate) equal to
the resource cost saving, P1QNR, and concentration has increased by (AB/OC).
Statistically, the increased concentration will be correlated with the in-
creased rents, but there is a more substantive connection: the increased
concentration is the mechanism by 'whichpart (AB x NR) of theresource cost
saving is realized.
If enough firmsmakethe same cost-reducing discovery, consumers
will share the resource cost saving. Forexample,if(s/oii)firms
make thediscovery, industry supply becomes QSTL. Price falls, but
there are still positive rents and concentration increases (so long as
demand is sufficiently inelastic to kecp CC'/OC < AB/OA). If the
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However,with an industry supply like QU, the correlation between efficiency
andconcentrationcanstillhold. As new firms catch on, each grows toward
maximalsize,and eventually this maximal size becomes the typical firm size.
Of course,witha sufficiently elastic demand, this firmgrowthneed not
implyincreasedconcentration. But, given the very large maximalsizes
usuallyencounteredin the scale economies literature, increased concentration
wouldbe the outcome usually expected.
While the constant-returns-to-scale case is important empirically and
usefuldidactically, some of the ambiguities entailed by the more conventional
(by text book standards) diminishing returnscase merit elaboration. This
requires distinguishing between increasing costs at the firm and industry
level. If the industry isconstant cost, the preceding analysis needs no
qualification:in the long-run a uniquely efficient firm will expand as
much as others contract, andit willcollect as rent all ofitsdifferential
productivity.The moreinteresting case analyticallyisincreasing costs for
both the firmand industry. This implies rents for some factors, and hence
an equilibrium excess of marginal cost over average cost (net of rents) for
intra-marginalfirms.This means,in turn,that any efficiencyinduced
outputexpansion has two offsetting effects on a firm's average cost: the
efficiencylowers the level of its average cost curve, but the output
expansion causes a move up along the curve. Under some supply anddemand
conditions, the latter effect candominate,so that average cost increases.2





=theaggregate of all firms but one (A), and
X =shiftparameter.
Then suppose A becomes more efficient, so its supp].y curve shifts rigbtward
(i.e., X increases and S> 0, the subscript denoting a partial derivative).
Assume for now that the resulting Increase in A's output also increases any
rneasure of industry concentration. Let us then see what is required for
average cost to decline while profitability increases.
Since costs and rents (R) must exhaust industry receipts, industry












ED,S =absolutevalue of the industry demand and supply elasticities.3
The first term on the r.h.s. of (3) is the pure "efficiencyt' effect and, were
this a constant cost industry (T 0,Er, =00)that would tell the whole
story: industry unit costs and unit rents would change by equal and opposite
amounts. The secondterm, the "output" effect, canoffset the first if (a) the
supply shift, is largeenough, and (b) industry supply issufficiently
inelastic(other firms save few resources by cutting their output) or demand9
sufficientlyelastic (so output expands enough to make the diminishing returns
important).1'
There is a further ambiguity in the relationship between unit cost and
unit rent(i.e. profitability). Since
d(RT/Q).—-dC
dX dA'
a negative relationship between the two requires that price fall by less than
unitcost.Whether or not this holds again depends on supply and demand
elasticities, but here it turns out that more elastic demand, on ba].ance,5
favors an increase in rents.
All the preceding results--and ambiguities--would hold if A were
initiallya small firm, except, ofcourse, thatconcentrationcould decrease.
Moregenerally, where differences in firms' costs underlie changes in their
market shares, one ought to expect any change in market structure to promote
efficiency. However, with constant returns-to-scale, there is a clear bias
towardincreased concentration as the main source of lover costs. So long as
a firm's superior tcchnolo' simply lowers the level of its horizontal
marginal cost curve, the firmwillexpand to maximal efficient size.
Demsetz tests for this bias by comparing rates of return of large and
small firms by industry. He finds no difference in these rates of return in
low-concentration industries, so small firms do not seem to have a cost ad-
vantage there. However, in highly concentrated markets, the largefirms have
thehigher rates of return, so Demsetz concludes that they have lower costs,
and, by inference, thatthiscost advantage is the source of their large size.
even if one accepts that inference, thise results can be consistcnL
with either competitive or obgopolist.ft pricthg.1'orexampie, an10
iriduntrywhose supplyschedule passes through V in Fiure 1, while some
firmshave marginal costs like Q1M could be characterized as competitive,
while the cost difference generates both high concentration and producer
rents. However, in another industry the aggregate marginal cost of the
superior firms could pass through U, while a collusive agreement among them
keeps the price at P1. In that case, a smaller firm could survive, and the
same disparity among rates of return would be observed. Indeed, once one
allows for both the traditional connection between concentration arid
collusion andfordifferences among firm costs, still less benign solutions
become consistent with Demsetz'c results. For example, let the long-run supply
from less efficient firms be increasong. Then let the process described by
Demsetz and McGee generate increased concentration which incidentally
decreases the cost of collusion. The large firms may now find it in their
interest to set a price above the previous competitive price (P1), even
though they must yield some market share to do this. The marginal firm in
this case would be both "small" andearninga "competitive" rate of return,
arid this result would also be consistent with the Dernsetzdata.
(Se,e Demsetz, l97, pp. 178-179.)
My intent here is not to catalog possibilities, but to indicate that
there is insufficient evidence for a conclusion that the effects of
concentration are either wholly beneficial or costly.
If an eclectic integration of the prevailing theory cannot therefore
be ruled out, it becomes a useful framework with which to evaluate the main
costsandbenefits empirically. In the remainder of the paper I try todo
•u;t thi:;. Spceifirn.lv.1. ruk the foulowi rig quentions:
1. ll 1m1)(lrLirlt. 1:; hr r,1.:i1iOrl:hII)between market structure arid
('I)::L:?11
2. How much of any resulting change in costs is translated into
price changes?
3.Howimportant is the relationship between market structure and
collusion, and how much are prices thereby affected?
While answers to these questions would be useful in clarifying an
important academic literature, they also have important policy implications.
The merits of an anti-concetration policy can hinge on whether the collusion
effects of concentration outweii the cost effects.
The discussion so far can be summarized symbolically as follows.




p =priceof the good
X =setor index of demand shifters
C =indexof supply shifters, which can be subsumed under the rubric
oftcostsIt
MS=somemeasure of market structure, i.e., the number and size
distribution of firms, which is a proxy for the cost of
collusion.
Putting aside important qualifications about the effects of varyinp.
'temand elasticities, the measurement and relevance of the various components
of C,etc., low cost collusion is azumed to lead ystematica1ly to an
increase in the ratio of price to either muri'inal or average cost, so that0 (where hipher MS implieslower
S cost collusion)
The underlying theory permits (5) to be applied acros: isolated markeL
for a homogeneous good, or to a particular market over time. For my purposes,
it will be useful to treat the variables in (5) as (logarithmic) time deri-
vatives rather than levels. The essential eclecticism is then introduced by
a companion function for costs
(6) C =c(y,Ms)
where
Y=setof exogenous determinants of the cost index, e.g., factor
prices.
The MS term in (6) is meanttosummarize whatisreally a two-way
(and non-moriotonic) relationship: changes in MS (in either direction) both
cause costs to decline and are induced by changes in costs. Once a
relationship like (6) is admitted, the total effects of MS on p become
more complex. Specifically,
() adC 7 is asc is
If, in the particular case of increased concentration, < 0, the prevailing
view that the first term on the r.h.s. is positive can be correct even though
the total derivative is negative. Moreover, if some of the effect of a cost
change shows up in producer rents (p/C 1), the prevailing view can be
wrong, but measured profitability will be positively relatedto MS.
The next section specifies (6). This is subsequently estimated, and
theresults are used to estimate (5) and (fl.These,in turn, provide the
answers to the questions I have posed.13
II.The Relationship Between Costs andMarketStructure
For simplicity,classify the firms in any industry into two groups:
Type L firms are or will become the largest in the industry; type M firms are




L, M =theunit cost of a firm in each group, which is assumed
to be the same for all firms in the group.
s =TypeL's share of industry output (e.g., a four-firm
concentration ratio, if the type are defined as the
largest four).
Since we will be interested in percentage changes over time in C (C), note
that
(9) C =[ L L+ (1- s) MM] + [L
M]dS
Thelast term on the right-hand side of (9) captures the effect of market
share changes on efficiency. It says that if, for example, the type L are
more efficient (L < M) and their market share increases, the resource cost




where r is the sumof all forcez changing costs whic'h arc' torwnonto the two
typessuch as secular productivity growth and factor price changes,and nil'1
)
suninarizeforces peculiar to eachgroup.This allows (9)tobe ecpressed as
() c=r+f+(ls)6+[M1,
where
This says thatthelevel, as well as the change, of market shares matter. For
example, if the type L arebecomingrelatively nre efficient over time
(f<0, 6 >0),thenindustrycosts will grow nre slowlythegreater the
6
typeL' s mrket share.
rther rearrangement of the terms leads to the following alternative






The meaning of these equations can be grasped by focusing on (13) when D > 0.
In that case, small firms have a cost advantage. If ds/dt < 0, industry15
efficiencYwill improve, because the moreefficient firmsgainmarket share
(declines).The degree of improvement
is greater the larger is thesmall
firmadvantage (i.e., the smalleris the l/Dterm in the denomiflator-
assume6 =0for the moment), andthelarger is the share of outputdue to
the more efficient firms (i.e.,the smaller is s). EquatiOn(13)' applies
symmetrically wtiere the largefirms have the cost advantage.
It is now necessarY to specifythe link between market structure






Cli,2 > oand are constantS
=outputgrowth rate of type ifirms.
Each equation is applicablefor D' or D> 0. These saythat the type of firm
with a cost advantage growsfaster over time in proportionto its cost advantage.
Adjustmentcosts affectthe size of the proportionalityconstants, :i and a2,
andi allow these to jffer__mergerSmay have differentcosts than divestitureS,
for example, Notice thatthe adjustmentprocessis only indirectly affected
by differences in therate of change of firmcosts(6). These will affect
D or D', but, for simplicity,I makenoallowance for forecasting: That
is, it' the ó are expectedto 'bemaintained,thefuturevalues of' D will
han'',and this could affect the repofletothecurrentD. The procec
described by(1l.)and(ill.)'is,however, completelY myopicin this regard.16
Since
(15) =s(1_s)(GL_GMJ
the adjustment process can be expressed
(16) Z =8(1-a1D' ,ifds/dt>0
(16)' Z =s(1-S ,ifds/dt< 0
where
Z =Ids/dtJY
The next step is to introduce the adjustment process into (13) and (13)' by
solving(i6) and(16)'for D andD' and replacingthese in the former
equations. This yields
—z2/(i-s) +[z+a1s(1-s)J6 (17) C=r++








Next,I introduce an assumed relationship between 5--the differential
between large and small firm cost changes- -and market growth.
The motivation for this is the empirical relationship between market structure
and growth. For example, Nelson (i3) reports a significantnegativecorre-
lation between the 1935-54changein industry concentration ratios and growth17
in value added. This is also presentth the 1947-67 sample I shall use sub-
sequently.8 In a model which purports to link market structure
to differ-
ential costs, such an empiri(al regularity
must logically be cost related.
Therefore assume thatrapidmarket growth reduces the small firm cost change
relative to that of large firma, perhaps becauseit permits the smallest firms to
adjust cheaply to minimum efficient size more quicklyor creates favorable "learning







g=growthin demand for output.
Thesign of a and b need notbe specified, but if growth is advantageous
for small firms, (b-a) should be
negative.10 If that is true, then (17) and
(17)' imply that, given large firmcost changes (i),growthreduces industry
costs. This occurs generally becausethe growth promotes lower small firm
costs. In the specific case of increasing
concentration, there is another
force at work, captured by thez6 term in(17).Increased concentration
in the face of rapid growth (decliningsmall firm costs) would imply
unusually low-cost large firms, and anunusual decline in industry costs as
they increase their market share.
To allow for empirical implementationof (17) and (17)' by
conventional techniques, I shall use 3-term Taylorexpansions about z =0.18
Thesecapture most of the important non].inearitles in the model,11 andthey












Finally,to obtain an enirica1 counterparttor, the cost changes
common to all firms,assume forsimplicity that each industry'stotaloutput
(Q)canbe described by a Cobb-Douglass production function





F=inputproductivity shift function, depending on secular (t)
productivity growth and other (0)forces.
Then assume; again for simplicity, that if some firms become more efficient,
this efficiency is not specific to any one input. At the industry-aggregate
level, this efficiency and its subsequent spread through any change in market
structure, can then be included among the other forces (0)inthe shift19
function in (22). As a further simplification, assume that the competitive
profit maximizing conditions for a firmcanbe used in approximating industry
unit cost changes, so
(23) C =- F+Ea1 p.1
where
p1 =inputprices, and now -
a1
=(constant)input cost sFiares.
Then assume a constant percentage secular growth ()ofindustry input
productivity, so that F can be decomposed
(214) F =F($)+
Wecan now relate (23) and (21;) to (21): r,s11nrtRrizing the productivity
and input pricetrends conto all firms, is simply -+ Za1 .,and
everythingelse onther.h.s. of(21) equals-F($).
Inthenext section, Iestimate the scheme in (21), (23) and (24).20
ii]. Enpirical Results: Costs and Market Structure
The basic cost relationships just developed are estimated here for a
subset of 11-digit SIC manufacturing industries. The subset consists of those
industries for which a meaningful change in unit cost (essentially industry
expendituresdeflated by an output index) canbecomputed for 19117-67. Since
this isthe longest period practicable, we face the risk that the basic cost
relationships will be obscured by technological change. However, I felt the
greater risk was thatshort-period changes inmarket structure would hide the
more fundamental relationship we seek to measure, a relationship which after
all purports to rationalize a nontrivial part of the existing variety of
market structure. Even 20 years is not long enough to permit as much change
in this variety as we might like.
Many current 11digitindustries had to be dropped because
of changes in classification between 1947 and l967, or because reliable
output indexes were unavailable from 1947.13 To limit potential measurement
error, "industries" with low or changing coverage or specialization ratios
were alsode1eted. Finally, I deleted two industries--drugs and
ballpoint pens--which experienced profound technological change in this
period. They met all the formal tests for inclusion, but their measured
productivity growthwasso atypical as to obscure some of the results and
raise questions about the comparability of their earlier and later outputs.
This left a sample of 165 industries.
Cost data available at the 11-digit level include only labor and raw
material expenditures by Census establishments. This leaves out expenditures
(e.g., advertising) typically incurred by administrative offices rather than
plants, and it excludes capital costs. I discuss later a modest adjustment
for the former deficiency. I assume that capital costs are proportional to an21
industry's gross book value of plant and equipment, for which data are
availableor can beestijBated.16 The factor of proportionality is derived
from Berndt and Christensen'S (1973), estimate of annual capital cost shares
for all manufacturing. I simply choose the proportionality factor that yields
for mysample the Berndt-Christeflsefl cost shares for 19147 and 1967.
17
To calculate the cost-share-weighted input price changes on the r.h. s.
of(23), distinguish three inputs: labor,rawmaterials and capital. The
input cost shares are set at their 1947-67 means, and the input price changes
are calculated from the fou.owinR data:
1. Labor--payroll per employee. (Compensation per man hour is not
consistently available for 19147.)
2. Raw materials. Purchase price indexes arenotavailable by
industry.However, the major changehereis a decline in the relative price
of agricultural to manufactured materials between 19147 and1967. Therefore,
using 1963 input-Output (Office ofisiness Economics, 1967) data on the
directand indirect purchases of agricultural products per dollar of purchases
for each SIC industry as weights, I estimate separate raw material price
indexesfor each industry.
18
3.Capital.Since industry-specificdata are unavailable, I assume
thatthe change in the rental price of capital is the same for each industry.
Finding empirical counterparts to the crucial market structure
variables on the r.h.s. of (21) poses a major difficulty. The relevant theory
applies to firms classified by terminal re:iative size regardless of initial
size. Unfortunately, corresponding pub1ihed data do not exist. We have only
OnVeI,L,ionlconcentration ratioi, which do not reveal where today's largest firms
came from. Therefore, I must make the strong asuntion that the large firms in
196! are the same as(orat least dominated by) those in 19147.In keeping22
with the simple size dichotomy embodied in(21) andtomaketheresults of
this study comparable with the bulk of the literature,£ is then defined
simply as the absolute 1947-67 changein an industry's u-firm concentration
ratio(and s is the average of the two concentrationratios). The reader
should, however, be aware that the model predictscost effects for turnover
of large firmsaswell as for net changes in their relativesize.19 Finally,
g is defined as the log of 1967divided by 1947 sales net of the log change
in the manufactured goods WPI. This variable's accuracy as ademand change
proxy depends on an implicit assumptionof u.nlt elastic demand for each
industry's product.
I want to test Demsetz and McGee's conjecturethat the process describec
by (21) is more important for increasesin concentration thandecreases.The
formal model does not allow for this except throughdifferences in cx.
Therefore, I simply estimate separatelythe effects of increases and
decreases in concentration, and see whetherthese effects are indeed dif-
ferent. The basic reessiOn is given inTable 1 for the values of a. which
minimize residual variance (see Note to Tablei).
The results lend some support to thebasic model and uncover a few
puzzles. For example, the model predictsa coefficient of +1 for the first
two factor price variables, and indeed both areinsiiificant]-y different
from 1. However, the results show neither the expecteddifference between
large and small firm cost changes(the coefficient of G2 should be less than
that of Gi), nor the relationship of the CR1 coefficientsto those of G2 and
01 (the former should equal the differenceof the latter two). And the
coefficients of the CR2 terms deviate from theirtheoretical value of -1.
In spite of' these drawbacks, a market share effect oncosts does show through,
and as I demonstrate litter, it Is empirically important.Moreover, this23
?ABIB3.
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7. C+ for increases in
concentration(0otherwise)
(a• .856for (6) and (7))
-.oo6 -.026
8. CR1- Sons as (6),for decreases
inconcentration
-.645 1.5ie6





B2 Coefficient of Determination .342
si Regression Standard rorx 100 20.760
Ibte: Thedependent variable is the log difference of 1967and 1947
unit costs. Unit costs are total industry costs(labor+ raw
materials +capital)deflated by an outputindex.Total costs
arefromthe 1947and 1967 Censusof Manufactures (with capital
costsestimated--seetext). production Indexes are from the
CensusofManufactLu'es, Index of'Productionvolumes. The 1947
valueis set at 100,andthe 1967 valuesderivedby successive
multiplication of cross-we1gted l95, 1958, 1963, and1967
intercensus output ratios.
De factorcost sharesare average, of 1947 and 1967 values.
See textforsources offactor price changes. Since the capital
costprice change is assumed to be a constant, only the capital
factor share is entered on line 3.
Growthin industry sales and concentration ratios are frois
Censusof MnufIwturøs.
The a1 are estimitedby runningtheregos:1cn on the compon.flt!
ofCR1end dividing the coeffccnt of g241 by that of gZ2M1/K1.
(Sincethis uses 2 degrees of freedom, t-ratio& are exaggerated
by about 1 percent, given the simp1c size of 165.)214.
effect is asymmetric in just the wayimpliedby Demsetz andMcGee.Decreases
in concentration do reduce costs, as predicted, and this does not depend on
the aberrant negative a.2° However, the effect is statistically insignificant
and onlyafractibn of that of similar increases in concentration. Essentially,
only increases in concentration matter verymuch.Theireffects,moreover, are
consistent with all of the nonlinearities emerging from the basic model.21
This consistency, though, hides a qualitative discrepancy between the empirical
results and the basic thrust of the model. npirically the main link between
market structure and costs comes via the term (CR1+) in which market structure
change and growth interact. An increase in concentration in a nongroving market
has trivial cost effects. In the model, this interaction term is supposed to
have effects proportional to differences in firmcostgrowth rates. However,
the coefficient of this term in Table 1 is much larger than any plausible
)
differencein cost growth rates, so it seems clear that the model incompletely
specifies the interaction of growthand marketstructure with costs. The
size of this interaction is a puzzle that demands further work, but here I shall
merelydraw out its empirical implications.
These are suninarized in Tables 2 and 3. These show the estimated
reduction in unit costs implied by Table 1 for several combinations of the
relevant growthandmarket. share variab les. These are chosenso as to range
roughly onestandard deviation on either side of the sample means. (No "low
growtht' calculations are shown, because these would uniformly yield trivial
cost savings.) Since risk of error increases with distance from sample means,
it is best to focus on the upper left-hand-corner entries in both tables. These
point to two conclusions: (i) Market share effects can be substantial. With
total factor productivity growing at around 2 percent per year in manufacturing,
about1/5of this growth can be attributed to post-war market structure changes
fora typical industry with increased concentration. (2) Th t.,ffect. i much25
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REJCTION IN UNIT COSTS. 19147.67, FOR VARIOUS C01.8ITOiS
OF COXENTRAT tOtE, IXREASE IN COnCrrRATr )1,

































Increlse 149' 50. 4L'
?iote ( )thcreaein uiit cotz.
The entries jhow the estUated (continuouji cirowde)
percent' decr'ze in the unit coztl 01' Ut iutr.
withthe pcifio chir3cteriti.•s ornnire1 c.., .i indu-
try with w.thzui.;ed concentrtivn. The ire
derjvd .yci1cu1'tttr. theCR1.wti CR.eeT.bL.?
Tib L) 1op1i by Utee ch.iricteritic, ifl
bythecot•zcientof these vwri b1 i_L.:-.r,:.
Thechirri.tjc. 4re tnsen to r:in e r.u ttlj e t in-
dsrdiF'tittjon Citi.r ..ide of the rnt,tnt Cr :ub-
sa.ipLc of in1u..rie.; with jnrr..a.ij,i cuncr:t- r.i:n.





(.nu..tri.setth'.ii,eU c er.rtl..nnc1.. :'J
in u)thtrcl:...26
TABLE3
REDJCrICN niurrr cosTs, 19.7 -6i.VARIOUSctMBr:AT Iorzs
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AND ALE3 GROWDI (NATURAL LOGS *100)
A.Average SalesGrowth(g .727)
?te: Seenote toTable 2. Means (standarddeviations)or
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Decrease 9.9 I 11.3 6.9
Snail I
1.5 Decrease 1.6 1.527
longer for increases inconcentration than for decreases. A givenincrease
in concentration lowers costs roughlytwo to three times as muchasdoes an
equal decrease.
It is worth examining the
sensitivity of these results to themodel
specification. Note, for example,theimplausible negative value of the
adjustment coefficient, a,which underlies the estimates for decreasesin
concentration. Forcing a nxre, orindeed any, plausible value of a onthe
estimates turnsoutto make little difference. I estimatedthe equation in Table I
constraining both of the atotake on various values from -30 to +30.Except
in the neighborhood of a=0(where the CR1 variable essentiallyreduces to
a single term and the explanatory powerof the regression deteriorates
noticeably), the results arevery muchthe same: the mean cost changes are
alwayswithina percentage point of thevalues in Tables 2 and 3, and the
regressionstandard error is also virtually unchanged.
Anotheraspect of the model that meritsexamination is the complexity
of the CR1 variables. Thesevariables dominate the main empirical result,
and they implyarelationship between costs and the level aswell as
the rate of change in concentration.
In Tables 2 and 3, this level effect
is almost always such that higherconcentration reduces costs, holding
constant the change in concentration.This relationship is most pronounced
where concentration increases. Thisresult merits skepticism, first because
itdependspartly on the way CR1 isconstructed, and second because the under-
lying model predicts it unambiguouslyonly when concefltraUO!1 >
Asa crude check on the validityof bnth thetheoretical underpinning
it.n' CRvariable and its tmpirical implications,L estimated a regression
in which the 1 market sharevariables (6-9) in Table 1 were replaced by
14
simplertelins whichseparatedthe concentration change from leve].effects:28
a growth interaction term (gZ) and the concentration ratio (s) were
entered separately for each subsample. The essential resultswere:
(1) The explanatory power of this regression is slightly smaller
(R2 =.33v. .31i) than in Table 1, which lends slight support to the more
complex formulation shown there.
(2) Coefficients of gZ and s are both significantly negative
(t =-2.2and -2.3) when concentration is increasing and insignificantly
negative when it is falling. This corroborates the basic result of Table 1
and the general pattern of results in Tables 2 and 3.
(3) The magnitude of the cost changes implied by this regression around
the sample means tends to be larger than in Tables 2 and 3. For example, the
changes corresponding to those in the first row of Table 2 would be 10.7,
15.8 and 6.2; for the first row of Table 3, we get 5.5, 8.0 and 2.8.Thi,s
implies that both the concentration changeand leveleffects in those tables
may be conservative, but the patterns here and in the tables are sufficiently
similar to support the amalgamation of these effects into the single CR1
variable.
So far I have been lumping productivity and input price effects on
costs together. To explore any interaction between market structure and
input prices, as well as to check on the reasonableness of the preceding
results, I estimated market structure effects on two productivity measures.
The first is an estimate of F in (23), derived by imposing the Cobb-Dougln.s
restriction that the coefficient of each weighted-factor-price change is unity.
This is essentially an estimate of total factor productivity. The second is
a conventional labor productivity (change in output per worker) estimate,
which is motivated in part by the measurement error in the nonlabor factor
prices. When thesc were regressed on the last six variables in Table 1,29
the pattern in that tablewas repeated:only increased concentration signi-
ficantly raised productivity. The magnitudes of the productivity improvement
are also familiar. At the sample means, these were:
Total factor productivity: 8.6 percent, if concentration increases;
3.1 percent, if' concentration falls.
Labor productivity: U.4 and 3.5percentrespectively.
Finally,I examine the sensitivity of the results to the time period
over which theyare estimated. The relevant issue here is how long it takes
before long-run effects dominate. A shorter time period will, for one thing,
make the production function-cost curve relationship in equations (22) and (23)
inappropriate. The moresubstantiverisk of specificatn error arises from
the need to distinguish the transitory from the permanent changes in market
structure upon which the theoretical link to cost changes rests. Over short
periods, concentration changes will be dominated by forces, like differences
between the shape of large and small firm short-run marginal costs, which
are ignored by our theory. Moreover, firms which are expanding rapidly to
takeadvantage of their lowerlong-run costs can incur a short-run adjustment
cost penalty. All this suggests that if we focus on too short a time period,
the market structure-cost relationship will be unreliable andattenuated.2'
Theory, though, gives no guidance on what is "too short" concretely.
Consequently, Tableshows the sample-mean cost changes derived
from replications of the regression in Table 1 on data from various subperiods.
For ease of comparison, the cost changes are shown per percentage point
change in concentration. I also show the t-ratio for the coefficient of
the growth interaction variable (CR1), since this turns out to be as concise
a sununary test of the significance of market structure effects on costs for
any subperiod as it is for the whole period.30
TABLE4
COST REXJCTION (loGs) PER PERCENTAGE INT CHANGE
IN CONCENTRATION, ESTD4ATED AT SAMPLE MEANS,
VARIOUS SUBPERIODS, 1947 -67
Period
Industries with Industries with
Increasing Concentration Decreasing Concentration






















Source: See text and Tables 1, 2, 3. Figures for 1947-67 cost reduction
are the upper left-hand-corner entries in Tables 2 and 3 divided
by the associated Z. All other cost reductions are derived
analogously from regressions on subperiod data.
Columnsheaded "t-ratio .. ." showabsoluteratio of the
coefficient of the CR1 variables toits standarderror in
the relevantregression.
() = costincrease
*= coefficientof CR2 also had t >2.All other t-ratios
for CR2 are less than 2.31
The general pattern observed in
the full period tends to hold for the
subperiods: changes in concentrationareassociatedwith cost reductions,
and these are more pronounced 'when
concentration increases. However, the
siibperiod effects tend to be smallerthan the full-period effects. This
indicates that the underlying processgenerating the cost reductions indeed
takes considerable time--at leasttwo decades--to work itself out and/orthat
it can be partly obscuredby impermanentchanges in marketruur26
In broad summary, then, the main resultof this section is that long-
period changes in market structure are accompaniedby increased efficiency.
This efficiency gain is nist pronounced'where concentration is high and rising
and where demandis growing. Inthenext section Idiscussthe implications
ofthisresult for output prices and forthe lengthyliterature onconcentra-
tionand profitability.32
)
III.MarketStructure, Prices and Profitability
The existing literature on profitability andconcentrationprovides a
convenient starting point for our analysis. Its almost universal conclusion
is that high concentration and high profitability go hand-in-hand. Since the
data used here share a coimnon source with Collins' and Preston's (1968)
contribution,their results provide a useful starting point. Their





Theymake no explicit adjustment for capital costs, so that their costs are
essentially plant payroll +materialcosts.27 Their sample, like mine, is
drawn from the 14.-digit SIC universe. Their essential result is the regression
reproduced on line 14 of Table ,inwhich M is made dependent on the 4-firm
concentration ratio and the ratio of gross book value of fixed assets to
industry sales. (The latter is meant to adjust for capital costs.) Their
results can be compared with those of similar regressions for each census
year for the sample used in this study (lines 1-6). The pattern is clear:
the coefficient of concentration is almost always siificantly positive and
on the order of .1. (The generally superior results for the capital intensity
variable in my sample, while encouraging, need not concern us here.) The
concentration effect seems weaker in the two earliest samples,but confidence
inthe basic result is greatly strengthened when the equation is estimated in
first differences ('.ines 7-9). Here the already weak level relationship
survivesthe noise introduced by differencing, and itsmaiitude consistently33
TABLE5
RRESSI0NS OFPRICE-COSTMARCIU onCONCETRATtOt1AND CAPITAL
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duplicatesthat in the Collins and Preston data. This comparability of
level and change effects is extremely important, since it permits comparison
between the main body of my results (which are necessarily estimated in
changes) and that of the literature typified by Collins and Prestonts study
(which invariably employs levels).
A typical inference drawn from results such as those in Table 5 is
that they signify inefficiency in concentrated markets. The problems wit1
this inference may be seen with the aid of the following simplified linear
representation of equations (5) and (6). Let the analogue to (5) be
(25) P=C+as,
where a =positivecoefficient measuring the impact of collusion, which
increases with concentration (s), while the analogue to (6) is
(26) C=C0-bs,
where b is another positive coefficient, arid C0 =constant.Here, all
markets are lnitally atomistic (s —0).Then some firms in some markets
discover lower costs and gain market share. If these firms are sufficiently
few, (26) will approximate the cross-market deviations of C from C0.Now,
even if (25) and (26)holdsimultaneously (see below), the reduced form
typically estimated in the literature will entirely conceal the process in




Thatis, a regression estimate of (27) reveals onlythe collusion effect,
when the reduced form for P is
(28) p= C0 +(a-b)s
The net allocative effect of concentration depends on therelative magnitudes
of a and b. Matters become more complicated if P responds differently
to the components of C in (26). For example, suppose that low-cost firms fail
to capture all the market because they eventuallyrun intoscale diseconomies, so
thattheir marginal cost exceeds average cost. Then P will not fall by the whole
bs term in (26). Approximate this, by rewriting (28),
(29) p=l.C0-kbs+as,
where k <1is a constant. In this r1d, the reduced form (27) becomes
(30) "M" =(a+(1-k)b]s
Note that both ()and(30) imply the same sign for the coefficient of s,
and that the sign in (30) is positive even if there is no collusion (a =0).
Thus,the conventional finding of a positive sign isconsistent with an entirely
noncollusiveprocess. There arethentwo mainempiricalproblems that have to be
confronted: essentially, (1) what is the relative magnitude of a and b, and
(2) is a positive?
Thequalitative answer to thefirst question canbegleanedbylooking
behind the results in Table5. UsingCollinsand Preston'sresult on line
and assumingthatsomething like (28) rather than (30)holds (i.e., that
k=1),the definition of themarginimplies36
(31) =.122=(1-M) -
d%nC]
so that the relevant total derivative is
(31)' d%np .122+dLnC ds —(1-M) d.s
where the first term on the r.h.s. is the assumed "collusion" component. In
these samples,(1 -ii).8, and thetop left-hand entry in Table 4isan
estimate of the second r.h.s. term when there is an increase in concentration.
Thus, in this case, an estimate of (31)' yields
(31)" dLnP.15 -.91=-.76
Thisresult--that the cost effect dominates stronglyoverany collusion
effect--will survive the subsequent refinements. So a major inference of
the received literature needs to be reversed. In fact, increased concentra-
tion signifies a net improvement in efficiency, andthisis a substantial
multiple of .nycollusioneffects.
To get at these price effects more directly, we want to estimate the
structural equation (5).Inthe present context, this requires estimates of
(log) changes in industry price indices. The Census' industry "unit value'
indices provide such estimates, but their use entails a major statistical
problem. The unitcostvariable is industry costs deflated by anoutput
index. Th. the same output index Is often used to deflate industry sales in
order o estimate the price irldex.28 Thus any measurement error in the output
index will be shared by both price and unit cost changes, and straightforward
OLestimat?of' (5)willyielc?. biased and inconsistent coefficients.37
Toovercome this problem, I use a two-stage procedure inwhich the
predicted values of the unit cost variable from the Table1 regression are
usedas regressors explaining price changes, thereby "purging"the cost
variable of the measurement error it shares with price changes. The resulting
estimate of the price change structural equation is in Table6.Itincludes
the following independent variables in additionto thechange in unit cost.
1. The change in concentration, to capture the partial (i.e.,costs-
held-constant) effect of market structure on prices.
2. Growth in sales. This Is a proxyforgrowth in demand, and this
should increase price if most markets have long-run increasing costs, or
adjustmentto equilibrium takesover 20 years.
3.A correction (OCST) for costs excluded fromtheCensus. The
establishment basis of census reporting meansthat the Census' cost measure
excludes items like advertising and centralheadquarters overhead. These
excludedcosts ought to affect price changes when they do not change proportionately
with the included costs. However, Internal. Revenue Service data from tax returns
include total deductions by item for 3-digit industries. The largest item ("cost
of sales and operations") corresponds roughly to thecostsmeasured by the Census.
Therefore, it is possible to compute a proxy for the ratio of total costs to costs
measured by the Census from the S data at the 3-digitlevel.The log change in
this ratio (0CST) is then entered for each 14-digit industry falling within any
3-digit class.29 Unless OCST is a perfect proxy, it should have a positive co-
efficient below that of COST.30
The results are consistent with prior expectations,and all of the co-
efficients are considerably greater than their asymptoticstandard error.3138
TABlE 6
EFFECT OF UNIT COST AND CONCENTRATION (RANGES ON
1947-67. 1#-DIGIT SIC LNDUSThS
PRICE QLANGES,
T)
Note: Dependent variable is log changeof1947-67
priceindex. Census unitvalue indexes are
available,,otherwise industry value of shipments is
deflated by an output index.(flie latter procedure
introduces error where there is net accumulation or
depletion of inventories.) Source: Census of
Manu::tures,various years.
COST is Dred.icted value from Table 1 regression.
See text.
See text for description of GRO and OCST. Sources:
GRO-Census of Manufactures, 1947 and 1967;OCST-
internalRevenue Service, Source Book of Statistics
of Income, 1947 and 1967.






DCR thange in 4firm .212 3.818
Vconcentration ratio
COST tog change in unitcost .934 21.767
GRO Log change In total
revenues
.050 4.630
OCST tog changeof ratio of
"ES" to "Census Costs
.323 3.773
Constant -- 1.200 0.911
industry
used where39
It is especially interesting that a 95percentconfidence interval for the
COST coefficient barely overlaps unity.Thismeansthat,at least over two
decades, sellers appear to retain some small partofanyunusualproductivity
gains (andbear part ofatypical cost increases). This coupled withthe
findingthathighand risingconcentration is conducive to lower costs may
help explain part of the observed correlationbetween concentration and
profitability. Butthereis more to this story,sincethe DCB coefficient
in Table 6 is alsopositive. Wecan get at the net effect of an increase in
concentration by using the information in Tables 2 and6 to evaluate the
total derivative in (7). For the "average" case of increasingconcentration
(DCR =+8.8),the approximate total effect is:
coefficient of DCR x+8.8=.212x8.8
-coefficientof COST x - .934x8.o
cost reduction if
DCR =+8.8 (seeTable 2)
=+1.9%-7.5%
=-5.6%
or _.6li% per percentage point increase inconcentration. This last figure
isdirectlycomparable to, and not very different from, (31)",which now
enabless to understand the process underlying themain result of the
concentration_profitability ilterature. Briefly, more concentrationraises
profitability, not because trices rise, but 3ecause theyfall by less than
costs.If weignore doubt about the significance of the costeffect when
co!lcentrationfalls, a similar calculation yields a pricereduction of
I.i.L percent for the average (DCR =-8.1)case (or .55percentper point
reduction in concentration). The two effects are roughly comparable,because
the weak cost effect is reinforced by the pure price effect inthe latter case.These relults pose an immediate question about the meaning of the
pure price effect. Is it plausible to attribute that effect to collusion?
Recall that an alternative interpretation would rely on rents to differential
efficiency, and these could be consistent with a competitive process. These
alternatives can be distinguished by estimating the effect of DCRseparately
for the rising and falling concentration subsamples. Since costs decline for
bothtypes of change, the "rent" interpretation implies an offsetting DCR effect
for both types. In particular, this means that the coefficient of a decrease in
concentrationshould be negative (or, since the cost effect is weak, at least not
positive), which offsets some of the tendency of the cost reduction to lower prices.
This "rent" interpretation is not, however, borne out empirically.
Whenthe DCR variable in Table 6isbifurcated, with each new variable equal
tothe DCR with a comnn sign andzerootherwise, the coefficients of both
are positiveand virtually identical to the value in Table 6.Thismeans
than when concentration falls, prices decline by more than costs andmeasured
industryprofitability falls. This process seems inconsistent with a pure "rent"
interpretation, so theasymmetry between the profitability effects of increasing
anddecreasing concentration renders the "cost of collusion" interpretation more
32 plausible.
Noncollusiveinterpretations cannot, however, be entirely ruled out. For
example, when an output expansion by an efficient firm imposes losses on other
firms,thereis no need for the industryin the aggregate to earn rents from this
efficiency. And the likelihood of negative aggregate rents is greater if the
efficient,growing firm is small initiallythan if it is large, simply because
thesmall firm has fewer inputs on which it can earn the efficiency rents that
migit outweigh everyone else's loss. Unless the small firm gets to be sufficientlylarge, concentration will decline. Thus, coexistence of declining rents with
declining concentration can be consistent with competition.33
Even if the results in Table 6 are consistent with some collusion, they
may overstate its importance. The theory whichpermitssome rents to efficient
firms implies that concentration-induced cost changes have a smaller effect on
price thanindustry-widechanges in, say, wage rates. The positive coefficient
of DCR may, in part, be correcting for our failure to allow, for such differential
effects by lumping all sources of cost change into the one COST variable. To
test this, I implemented something like (29) by breaking COST into the component
due to the change in concentration and that due to all other forces. The co-
efficients of these were .75 and .98, respectively, while that of DCR declined
to .16. The implied total effect on price of an average increase in concentration
becomes 1i..5,insteadof -5.6 percent. While this procedure does not allow a test
of significance, the difference in the cost coefficients is consistent with some
rents for innovating firms even in the absence of collusion.
The direct effect of concentration on price seems to have a shorter gesta-
tion period than the cost effect. This is evident in Table 7, which gives the
coefficient of DCR in subperiod estimates of the regression in Table 6. These
are uniformly positive and close to the full period estimate. This means that
prices adjust completely to a change in concentration within a decade and that
temporary and permanent changes have equally powerful price effects. This pattern
may help explain the survival of the erroneous conventional wisdom about concentra-
tion. Consider a merger which permanently increases concentration and reduces
collusion costs. This permanence may hinge on efficiencies which, however, take
a 1on time for the merged firm to implement. Thus, the immediate and perhaps
most easily detectable effect of the merger may well be an increase in price.142
Since efficiency effects take hold so gradually, it would be desirable
to observe the full price effect of changes in concentration over periods even
longer than two decades. The only data currently available for this are crude,
but they are suggestive. For a handful of 1-digit industries from 1939 to 1967
output indexes can be pieced together. Since sales data are not uniformly avail-
able, deflating value added by output is as close as we can come to a price in.-
dex. In Table 8, the change in this "unit value added" is shown for 214 industries
which experienced a large (10 or more percentage points) change in concentration,
from1939 to 1967, and whose growth in output or value added over the period was
at least half that of all manufacturing or of their 2-digit groups. On average,
these industries' "price" performance is about 20 percent better than that of
either their 2-digit groups or all manufacturing. Whileitis hardly uniform,
this superior performance characterize virtually all the large deviations. Like
the previous results, the degree of superiorityis similarregardlessof the direc-
tion of change in concentration (but, here itis more reliable for decreases).
Since theaverage change inconcentration here is about 17 percentage points, the
average price effects here are aboutdouble those for the l9k7_67 sample.
bttoo much can be made of this result, but it hints at the danger of
ignoring the longer runconsequencesof a change in concentration.
TheRole of the Number of Firms in an Industry. The empirical work has so
far focused on concentration, since this allows comparability with a large litera-
tu.re. However another structural characteristic, the number of firms, merits ex-
aznination, for it may affect both costs and prices. Telser (1972) has shown that,
holding concentration constant, the price-cost margin increases with the number
of firms. While this maydisappointCournot's descendants, Telser suggests that
it is consistent with an alternative, competitive dis-equilibrium explanation:43
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Note: Columns (1) and (3arelogarithms of a 1967indexof value added per unit
V1ueadded per uni' is value added deflated by an indexofoutput.
of output (1939 =i.oo).
Valie ac'dedandoutputindexes are from Census of Manufactures various years.
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914'7outputindexes were unavailable for the following industries: 281414,31496, 3555, 3953, andall































































































































Average 100.2*79.14 -18.2 Average 100.2* 77.5 -23.2
Standard Error 9.9 11.0 Standard Error 13.5 8.5the highmarginsare attracting entrants. But our theory of structure-related
efficiency raisesyet another alternative. In its broadest form that theory
positsa relationship between efficiency andinequality, of which concentra-
tionis just one indicator. Thus, consider the case where concentration in-
creases eventhough the number of firms also increases, so smaller firms are
losingmarket share. This means thatthediscrepancy in size between the largest
firm and the "typicalt'firm growswider thanit wouldifboth were gaining mar-
ketshare. On the other hand, when concentration declines in the race of an exit
of firms, this size discrepancy is narrowing more than otherwise. Ineither
case,the unusuallyrapidgrowthof one type of firm ought to be relatedto an
unusualcost advantage. To test this, I added two terms to the regression in
Table 1: the log change in number of firms if concentration decreased (zero
otherwise), and the same variable for industries with decreasing concentration
(zero otherwise). On the preceding argument, these should have negativeand
positive coefficients respectively. They did, though theeffects were not overly
powerfu.1. (both elastricties were around .1, with t-ratiosof about 1.6).
To ascertain the competitive effects of a change in the number firms, I
then added this variable to the regression in Table 6. OnTelser's tentative
explanation for his result, more firms would be attracted by rising prices,
holding costs constant. However, the coefficient of the log changein number
of firms is virtually zero (.003, t =0.2).Thus my data hint that the main
role played by the number firms is on the cost side of the profitability equa-
tion.
Conclusions
Most practitioners have chosen to interpret the profitability-
concentr:ttion relationship as evidence for collusion. A minority hasi6
emphasized the concentration-efficiency nexus. The evidence here is consis-
tent with an eclectic view, but one in which efficiency effects predominate.
An important implication of this finding is that, for an its bulk, the
concentration-profitability literature is incomplete. Since it has largely
been motivated by a collusion model, most of its growth has been elaboration
of that theme. However, attention to the efficiency effects of concentration
may yield the larger research payoff. For example, one major task is to
separate the symptomatic from the causal elements in the statistical relation-
ship between concentration and efficiency. A firm may stumble onto a cost-
reducing process and then expand its share of the market. The two events
yield distinguishable efficiency gains. The former of these is not caused
by the increase in concentration, but both will be statistically related to
it. More commonly, perhaps, efficiency does not come free, and this creates
an immediate complication. Investmentinsearchforefficiency will be
induced by low costs of expansion, so in that sense the Increase in concen-
tration and the initial discovery are causally related.4
If the literature is incomplete, so is the rationale it provides for
legal hostility to concentration. The possibility that an anti-concentration
policy can retain most of the efficiency gains associated with concentration
and rield a net improvement in resource allocation cannot be ruled out.
it if the magnitudes of the effects we have measured here are close to
correct, the odds are against thatpossibility.It is not clear that U.S.
antitrust policy restricts concentration very much (Pashigian, 1968; Stigler,
1966). However, if it does this, it is more likely to reduce efficiency, raise
prices, and reduce owner wealth.17
Toget at the magnitude of therisks facing an anti-concentration
policy, we canfocuson industries which have afour-firm concentration
ratio greater than .5. The averageconcentration ratio in this sector is
around .7, and the typical member spentsomething over 70 cents per dollar
of output for payroll and raw materials.Now imagine that through a divesti-
ture action the concentration ratio forsuch an industry is reduced to .5.
Given our empirical results, this
could raise unit costs on the order of
20 percent, which in turn wouldraise priceby 10 to 15 percent. Assuming
unit elastic demand, the lower figurewould impose a cost on consumers of
around 9.6w per dollar's worth of output,of which 9.l would be a transfer
to producers. Resource costs would increaseby around l2.7 per dollar of
output, so producers would lose3.6 per dollar, ar. the total loss would be
just over l3& Since thisconcentrated sector currently accounts foraround 1/1
or $250 billion of manufacturiIsales, any extensive deconcexltratiofl program
would risk imposing losses which are manytimes greater than the typicales-
timates (e.g., see Harberger, l95li)of the benefits such a policy might have
been thoughttoproduce.Footnotes
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1SeeWilliamson (1968) fora discussion of thiskind of problem.
2Thjsdoes not, of course, mean that efficiency, appropriately de-
fined, deteriorates, but only that averagecost is an inappropriate efficiency
proxy in this case.
3This follows from
A T sT
whenwe impose a supply-demand equilibrium condition on dP/dX.Thiscon-
dition comes down to
dP___ i3ED+ES )For twofamiliarcases--a constant shift ins,anda constant
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ifA is initiallyan averagefirm,sothat its unitrentsequal R Is
thistoo is negative.
It attenuates the price decrease, but also retards the fall in unit
cost.
6There is another sense in whichthelevel of market share matters,
which turns out to be empirica]-li important:the bracketed term gets larger,
the larger the share of the most efficient type firm,because C gets smaller.
Thus, for a given increase in that type'sshare, the cost effect is larger the
larger its market share.50
7Notethatthere is an implicit conjecture here.that Z is correlated
with s(l-s), because the aD terms affect only relative firm growth rates
directly.In fact, in the sample we shall use subsequently, the correlation
of the 19147_67 Z with the 1911.7 s(l-s) is a significant ÷.22.
8Thesimple correlation is -.23.
9Thatis, the smallfirm ina growing industry could accumulate a given
volumeof output (and experience) as quickly as a larger firm In a dec1inin
industry.
10There is an ambiguity here in that theempirical regularity we are
seekingto incorporateapplies to smallfirms generally, while the m
variable applies to firms which end up small whatever their original size.
I treat the effect of this ambiguity later, but it is essentially forced by
the available data.
UThe important nonliriearities arise from the dual role of Z as an
indicator and implementor of cost changes. Ignoring the growth Interaction
implied by (20), this feedback leads to C < 0. The growth interaction
complicates this: becomes uacertain for ds >0,because higher Z
implies loSs of the growth benefits on small firm costs. These benefits
depend on the level of small firm costs, and this makes Czg 0 for
ds0. For example, if ds >0,dZ > 0 implies an increase in the ratio
M/L (or D'). Since the beneficial effect of g on C is amplified at
higher levels of' M and diluted by the positive ds, this implies further
that C <0.These results for Cand C hold both for (17) and (17)'
zg zz zg
and their Taylor expansion (21).51
'The main changes in classific3.tiOfl occur in 1958. in some cases, the
post 1958 SICcombines pre-1958 industries. These were retained in the sample
only Ifpre-1958 concentration ratios could be reliablyinferred for the post-
1958 industry. In practice, this meansthat theindustries merged have firms
so small that none could conceivablybe among the four largest prior to 1958,
because the total output of the merged industry'slargest four is much less
than the average outputof the merging industry's largest four.
The 19511. CensusofManufactUres, volume 5, singles outindustries with
unreliable output indexes. I deleted suchindustrieswhere the 19511.index
(19WT100) was morethan 50 percent different from that of its 2-digit
class.
specialization meansthatthe plants in the SIC industry produce
substantial amounts for other markets, thus callinginto question the relevance
of the market definition. Low coverage meansthat plants elsewhere produce a
large part of this industry's output,thus calling into question the meaning
ofnarrowlybased market structure measures. I deleted industries where the
1917 or 1967 product of the specialization aod coverage ratio wasunder .6
or where either changedby over .1 betweentheseyears.
15Alist of these industries is available on request. They accountfor
about half of U.S. manufacturing sales.
l6Gross book value (GBV) data are available from19511. (Annual Surveyof
Manufactures),but the coverage expands over time.Wheregapshad to be
filled, a log linear form of GBVt1 =f'(G1t,x) wasfirstestimated, where X
tvctorwhich includes capital expendituresbetween t -1ai'dt (o
artinverseform of the relationship runningfromGBVt_i to G!3V),52
industry sales(which is used as a size deflator), and Internal Revenue
Service data on assets for the 3-digit industry superclass. The missing
GBVt1 are then filled in usingthe regression weights and known values of
the independent variables. The entire set of GBV17 had to be estimated
in this fashion, since pre-1954 GBVdataare unavailable.
None of the results reported subsequently are substantiallydifferent
ifcapitalcosts are excluded. Thecorrelation between the capital cost
inclusive and exclusive cost changes is +.98.




FM=Manufacturedproducts wholesale price index,
PA =Farmproducts WPI,
AG1 =1963direct and indirect purchases of agricultural products
per dollar of SIC industry l's totalpurchases of materials.
For 1957 =100: =.759,PA7 =1.099, =1.072,PA67 =l.00kl.
l9addition,if myimplicit assumption about the importance of adjust-
ment costs is wrong, effects of intraperiod changes in concentration will not
be captured. For example, both a brief rise in concentration and a subsequent
fall which offsets it might be cost-induced, and these effects are assumed
away here.
20Much the same cost effect was found by assuming any of a wide r&nge of
positive values for a for that subsample. See subsequent discussion.53
Specifically,at the sample means, we obtain the following signs
fcr partial derivatives from the regressic (with thesignsderived from





221heimportance of the growth interactionis clear when the regression
inTable 1 is estimated without some of the other nonlinearities. No explana-
torypower is gained by addingonly the change in concentration, or CR2, to
thefirst 5variables.However, mostofthe able 1 results a.rereproduced
when lineargrowthinteraction terms (gZ1)areadded. See subsequent dis-
cussicn.
23There aretwo typesofcost changecoflcefltratiOfl level relationships
embodied.in the model. One is described in footnotet3 above.
The other resides in the market share adjustment process((16) and
(16)'.If we hold Z constant, as is done alongtherows of Tables 2 and
3, andthe .djustment coefficient is also constant,then the large firm-sma
firm:st difference(the D' or D in ((16)or(16)')isimplicitly a fur-
tionof s, andtheextent of this difference obviously affectsC. Specif-
ically, the$azne Zimplies a higher D' theftrther s is from .5. Thus
ie relatic; obe'eenC and s is reinforcedfor s>., butoffset
or




2nealso has to be aiind.fulofthe reciprocal nature of this relation-
ship. A firm--and therefore the industry in which it isclassified--can
become more efficient today, while its cost advantage is only subsequently
translated into larger market share.
2ne reason for this is that more general long-run equilibrium cost
changes occur slowly. The subperiod regressions underlyingTable 4 tend to
becharacterizedby insignificant or implausible negative coefficientsfor
thefactor-share-weighted input price change terms, which is a symptom of'
incomplete adaptation to these price changes. Like themarket share effects,
these input price effects also tend to be more erratic over thetwo shorter
subperiods.
2See Collins & Preston (1968), p. 119 for qualifications.
28d the rest of the time the output indexisestimated by deflatirg
industrysales by the price Index.
'9More precisely, our main cost variable is census costs +estimated
capital (interest +depreciation)costs. In computing OCST, therefore, the
denominator includes depreciation, interest and.2x stockholders equity
(roughlythe postwar average pre-ta.x return on equity in manufacturing) as
well as "cost of sales" and operations. The numerator is reportedtotal
deductions plus the imputed cost of equity.
30It thetrue relationship be
p=aC*
where C* =changein totalcosts.Let C =costsincludedin COST, so
C* R C55
where R =C*/C.However,we know only the proxy for R, OCST. If
R=b+d(OcsT)
the estimate of p is
P =ab+ad(OCST)+aC
Ifthere is no measurement error, b =0,d =1,andad =a.3it since
OCSTis not a perfect proxy, d < 1andE(ad) <a.
So long as d >0,we want to take account of any market share
effects on the costs not in C. For example, If the share ofcentral office
overhead in total costs grows with concentration, part of the previously
calculated cost reduction would be offset. However, regressingOCST on the
market share variable in Table 1 yielded insignificant (and numerically
trivial) effects of both increased and decreased concentration.
31The coefficient of GRO may be partly spurious, since the dependent
variableis GRO-change inoutput. If GRO is deleted, the remaining co-
efficients arevirtually unchanged and their standard errors increase by
about:/.
Stigler(1961i.) argues that the Herfindahl (H) index is superiorto the con-
centration ratio as a proxy for the cost of collusion. Sincethe Herfindahi
index is unavailable for our sample, this argument cannotbe directly tested.
However,Nelson (1963)provides H for a sample of Ii.-digitindustries.I
regressedthe log of H on the log of concentration and its square,and
found an essentially constant elasticity of about 1.8. Thiscrude empiricism
and Stigler's theory suggest thatraising concentration to a power and sub-
situting the change in this varialbe for DCR in Table6 will improve the56
results, ifthe"cost of collusion" interpretation is correct. I attempted
thistransformation for powers ranging from .25 to 2, end the results are
encouraging for Stigler's model. The coefficient of this transformed variable
rose steadily relative to its asymptotic standard error as the power was
increased. At a power =2,this ratio was 4.97 (compared to 3.82 for power =
-2 1),andthe coefficient is .25 x10
pirically, this means that thetotalprice effect of a change in
concentratlonis essentially invariant to the level of concentration (s),
because the differing price andcosteffects cancel. To illustrate, for
DCR=+8.8,and thesample average CR (=36.3),thepartial price effect
is.25 x 10_2(1l0.72 -3192)=1.6%,and the total price effect is -5.9%.
For CR =6o,this calculation is .25 x lo_2(61.14.2 -55.62)=2.6%,but
note from Table 2 that the cost effect is also larger (9.2% v. 8.0%), and the
total effect (2.6 -.94(9.2)=-6.0)Is the same.
am indebted to Yale Brozen for pointing this out. A simple numerical
example may clarify his argument:Considera five—firm industrj where firm A
initially has 6o percent of the market and B, .. .,Eeach have 10 percent.
Let "CR" then be 60 percent. Initially P =C=1,and there are zero rents.
Now let any one of these firms (a) discover a way to lower C to .8, (b) cut
P to .9 and (c) add 20 points to its market share. The efficient, growing
firmthengets rent per unitofits output =.1,while all other firms suffer
a loss of .1 per unit. If A is the efficient firm, CR will Increase to 80,
and industry rents per unit will be +.o6 =.80(.i)+.20(—.1).If B is the
efficient firm and gains sales proportionately from other firms (including A),
CR will decline to I6_2/3; B Is bigger (30 percent of the market), but still
not as big as A. In this case, unit rents are _.014 =.30(+.l)+.T0(—.i).57
There would be increasing rentstogether with decreasingconcentration if B
obtains between 50 and 60percentof the market and thus replaces A asthe
dominant firm. The essential logicof the example is that the firmdiscovering
the efficiency can apply it(and earn rents) to all its output, not justthe
output it adds; and A has the largeroutput base.
This is at least one wayto interpretthe importanceofthe interaction
between growth andconcentrationin explaining efficiency. The growthcan
bothlower expansion costs andincreasethe payoff to a cost-saving discovery.58
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